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AIDS is about . . . loss of control-control of one's bowels and
bladder, one's arms or legs, one's life . . . AIDS is the moment to
moment management of uncertainty. It's a roller coaster ride without
a seat belt. Once this ride begins, there is never a moment when the
rush of events that swirl around you stops long enough for you to get
your bearings. AIDS is like motion sickness except you realize that
you'll never stop moving; one way or another, you'll be dealing with
AIDS for the rest of your life. . . . It's like standing in the middle
of the New York Stock exchange at midday: buzzers and lights
flashing, everyone yelling, a million opinions, a momentum.
- Michael Callen, Person With AIDS--
As a gay man, I experience the AIDS crisis as the triumph of anxiety
and uncertainty. Am I infected with a deadly virus? Are my friends? If
we are, will we die? How horribly? How soon?
Every aspect of the AIDS crisis resonates with this uncertainty. Scien-
tists still debate whether the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is the
"cause" of AIDS. They are unable to explain why the virus can lay dor-
mant and harmless for years and why it is then suddenly activated. Nor
can scientists explain the differing physical manifestations of HIV infec-
tion or predict what infections will afflict which of us, when, or how. Our
doctors (for those of us who have doctors) are unable to provide treat-
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ments and we have only limited success gaining access to "experimental"
drugs, which then have little success in our bodies. Society's primary re-
sponse is concern that AIDS will "break out into the general population,"
of which, presumably, we are not a part, and where, presumably, the
deaths will really matter. Society threatens us with quarantine, barely
veiling its contempt and hatred, while promising, but rarely delivering,
compassion.
"Now for the good news," writes editor Harlon Dalton in his preface
to AIDS and the Law: A Guide for the Public: "In putting together this
book I have become convinced (much to my surprise) that our legal system
is uniquely suited to the task at hand."' Dalton's "optimism"2 springs
from the fact that "[t]he law's formulaic quality means, among other
things, that we need not reinvent the wheel to deal with AIDS-related
legal issues. . . . The practical differences . . . can be apprehended and
taken account of by the law with relative ease." 3
AIDS and the Law is a herculean effort aimed at describing the legal
aspects of the AIDS crisis to the public. The book, a collection of twenty
essays, each written by different authors, arranges the AIDS crisis into six
sections: Medical Background, Government Responses to AIDS, Private
Sector Responses to AIDS, AIDS and Health Care, AIDS in Institutions
(the Military and Prisons), and the Problems of Special Groups (intrave-
nous drug abusers, blacks, and the lesbian and gay communities). The
collection is introduced by a preface from Dalton, an associate professor at
Yale Law School, and by a chapter entitled "A Little Law for Non-
Lawyers," written by the book's other editor Scott Burris, a recent gradu-
ate of Yale Law School.
Inherent in an effort like AIDS and the Law is an attempt to order the
uncertainty and to control the anxiety that defines the AIDS crisis. At
times this organizing effort is explicit, as in Dalton's preface; at other
times it is more subtle. For example, existing laws are described as if they
will automatically determine the outcome of AIDS-related litigation,
while destabilizing developments, such as new laws, are submerged. De-
spite its "organizing" impulse, AIDS and the Law also captures the inde-
terminacy and contradiction of AIDS and the legal system.' Litigative
outcomes are described as unpredictable and the destabilizing conse-
quences of changing laws are acknowledged.




4. These concepts are borrowed from David Trubek's summary of the critical legal studies (CLS)
movement, arguing that the CLS critique of legal order "challenges the idea that a legal order exists
in any society. The critique is based on four principles: indeterminacy, antiformalism, contradiction,
and marginality." Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 575, 577-78 (1984).
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This essay explores the manner in which AIDS and the Law struggles
to order the uncertainty of AIDS-related law. The first section focuses on
AIDS-related litigation; the second section on AIDS-related legislation.
My point in these sections is that one of the many values5 of AIDS and
the Law is the manner in which the tension between order and uncer-
tainty is reflected and played out in the book. In the third section, I dis-
cuss a parallel attempt to find order in and to control the AIDS cri-
sis-the efforts of people with AIDS to overcome victimization and to take
control of their lives. "We must fight," Michael Callen writes, "to retain
as much control over our lives as possible."8 The fourth section is an ex-
ample of the way these two efforts to control AIDS (the legal system and
the AIDS empowerment movement) intersect. By drawing an analogy be-
tween these efforts, I attempt to demonstrate that another value of AIDS
and the Law is that the book's struggle to "organize" and "control" AIDS
law coincides with the struggle of people with AIDS to "order" and "con-
trol" AIDS itself.
I. THE UNCERTAINTY OF AIDS-RELATED LITIGATION
Much of what constitutes AIDS law, and thus AIDS and the Law, is
constructed from existing law.7 The chapters of AIDS and the Law dis-
cuss how AIDS will be incorporated into a wide range of traditional legal
fields, from public health and criminal law to torts, labor, landlord/ten-
ant, and insurance law. AIDS and the Law is essentially a march through
these legal subjects, showing how analogous precedents have been, or
might be, applied to AIDS-related situations.
At times, AIDS and the Law depicts these applications as "formulaic"
and their outcomes as, therefore, inevitable.' For instance, Dalton
explains:
The law's formulaic quality means, among other things, that we
need not reinvent the wheel to deal with AIDS-related legal issues.
As chapter after chapter makes clear, the institutional and concep-
5. The more practical values of the book to lawyers-for example, its helpfulness as a tool in
planning litigative and legislative strategies-are lauded time and again throughout this essay. They
cannot be overstated.
In addition, though I feel unqualified to comment on whether AIDS and the Law succeeds in its
attempt to explain AIDS law to non-lawyers, the book's editors should be highly commended for their
effort. The authors of the book were chosen and the text carefully edited so as to make the book
intelligible to non-lawyers. While much has been written for lawyers about AIDS law, AIDS and the
Law represents the only such endeavor directed to non-lawyers. Finally, Professor Dalton, editor
Burris, and the Yale AIDS Law Project deserve significant praise for having concentrated on the legal
issues the AIDS crisis raises at a time when little attention was paid to such issues.
6. Callen, Introduction, in SURVIVING AND THRIVING WITH AIDS: HINTS FOR THE NEWLY
DIAGNOSED ix (M. Callen ed. 1987).
7. The vast exception to that general principle is "new" law, namely statutes that have been
passed by state legislatures and Congress to directly address the AIDS crisis. See infra Part II.
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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tual framework for dealing with such issues already exists; the prin-
ciples and procedures that will guide decision-making are, for the
most part, already in place. Analogous situations abound, from cases
involving sexual transmission of genital herpes to attempts to quar-
antine persons with bubonic plague; from cases involving schoolchil-
dren infected with the hepatitis B virus to efforts to round up prosti-
tutes to stem the spread of syphilis. Perhaps the most important
guiding light is the explosion of statutes and cases addressing dis-
crimination against the disabled and against people who are per-
ceived as disabled.'
Although Dalton is correct that "analogous situations abound," what
AIDS and the Law also depicts is not the "ease" with which AIDS can be
"taken account of" by the legal system, but rather how indeterminate the
applications of existing areas of law may be to this new situation.
A. The Indeterminacy of Existing Law
Consider, for example, Dalton's "most important guiding
light,"'10-"the explosion of statutes and cases addressing discrimination
against the disabled." '11 Much of what constitutes AIDS law is built
around the protections granted by section 504 of the Vocational Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973,12 which considers people with AIDS to be disabled
persons. For instance, as AIDS and the Law makes clear, HIV-infected
schoolchildren and employees have successfully challenged their removal
from the classroom and workplace by invoking section 504.13 But the very
applicability of section 504 to AIDS (not to mention how cases would be
decided) remained largely uncertain until a 1987 Supreme Court decision,
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,1' involving a tubercular school
9. Dalton, supra note 1, at xiii.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
In relevant part, the statute provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in section
706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Exec-
utive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
13. See, e.g., Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (school
board ordered to admit HIV-infected schoolchildren to classroom); Chalk v. United States Dist.
Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (school ordered to reinstate HIV-infected teacher to classroom
duty).
14. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). The uncertainty surrounding § 504's applicability was fostered in
large part by the Reagan Administration Justice Department. In 1986, the Justice Department took
the position that, although the Rehabilitation Act prohibited discrimination based on the disabling
effects of AIDS, discrimination based on an employer's fear of contagion was not covered and there-
fore such fear could justify an employee's dismissal. The Supreme Court's decision in Arline specifi-
cally repudiated the Justice Department's position, stating "[wie do not agree with petitioners that, in
defining a handicapped individual under § 504, the contagious effects of a disease can be meaning-
fully distinguished from the disease's physical effects on a claimant in a case such as this." Id. at
[Vol. 98: 975
1989] AIDS and the Law
teacher, 5 held that persons with contagious diseases could be considered
"handicapped" within the meaning of the Act.
Arline stands for the proposition that section 504 protects persons with
AIDS. Yet, open questions concerning disability law still abound: are
asymptomatic HIV-infected persons 6 "disabled" within the meaning of
section 504?17 Is an HIV-infected person not "otherwise qualified" solely
1128.
Nonetheless, not until it was prompted by the President's AIDS Commission some fifteen months
later, see THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC,
REPORT 121-23 (June 1988), and then ordered by the White House did the Justice Department
retreat from this earlier position. U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum for Arthur B.
Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, Re: Application of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to
HIV-infected Individuals 1 (Sept. 27, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Justice Department Memorandum],
Cover Letter from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel
(Oct. 6, 1988).
15. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
16. Asymptomatic HIV-infected persons are person who test positive for the presence of antibo-
dies to HIV but who have developed no clinical manifestations resulting from their HIV-infection.
Asymptomatic infection was traditionally considered the early phase of HIV disease, with the inter-
mediate phase being AIDS related complex (ARC), and the final phase being acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome, or AIDS. ARC, as defined by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), was the
presence, for three or more months, of two of a list of clinical manifestations of disease (fever, weight
loss, lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph nodes), diarrhea, fatigue or night sweats) coupled with certain
specific types of poor blood counts, and the absence of the opportunistic infections which delineate the
onset of AIDS. AIDS, the final breakdown of the immune system, was defined by the CDC as the
presence of certain specific opportunistic infections which a person with a healthy immune system
easily fights off. In particular, most people with AIDS fall prey to a pneumonia called pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia, or to a cancer entitled Kaposi's sarcoma. These groupings are very well described
by Richard Green in AIDS and the Law. Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE
LAW 28, 30 (H. Dalton, S. Burris & Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987) (citing Revisions of the Case
Definition of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National Reporting, 34 MMWR 373,
373-375 (1985)). Because these categories are clinically inexact and definitionally clumsy, efforts have
been undertaken to redefine AIDS as "HIV disease" and to refer to a spectrum of HIV disease,
instead of to asymptomatic HIV-infection, ARC and AIDS. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS 7 (1986); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988 at 3 (1988); THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC REPORT 3 (June 1988).
17. The generally applicable definition of "handicap" in federal disability law is "any person who
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment." 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1973). Physical impairment is then defined as, "[A]ny physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body sys-
tems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardio-
vascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine .. " 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1987).
The phrase "asymptomatic" might suggest that such an asymptomatically HIV-infected person
would not comport with this definition. However, the Justice Department recently quoted the Sur-
geon General of the United States as stating:
In addition to acute flu-like illness, early stages of the disease may involve subclinical manifes-
tations, i.e., impairments and no visible signs of illness. The overwhelming majority of infected
persons exhibit detectable abnormalities of the immune system . . . [F]rom a purely scientific
perspective, persons with HIV-infection are clearly impaired. They are not comparable to an
immune carrier of a contagious disease such as Hepatitis B. Like a person in the early stages
of cancer, they may appear outwardly healthy but are in fact seriously ill.
1988 Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 14, at 7-8 (quoting Letter from C. Everett
Koop, M.D., Surgeon General, to Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel (July 29, 1988)).
Further, the physical impairment suggested by the Surgeon General is generally considered to limit
major life activities associated, for instance, with procreation and intimacy. Id. at 9-13. Thus, asymp-
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because of her infection?18 To what extent will courts force employers and
others to make "reasonable accommodations" for people with AIDS?19
Thus, while federal and state laws exist, and generally cover people with
AIDS, application of these laws to AIDS cases is far from formalistic.20
This indeterminacy is illustrated by AIDS and the Law's several dis-
cussions of whether disability law would prevent employers from requir-
tomatic HIV-infected persons should be considered handicapped persons protected by § 504. More-
over, asymptomatic HIV-infected persons are also often "regarded as" being handicapped, and there-
fore should be protected by § 504 for that reason as well.
Not surprisingly, the federal courts that have considered this issue have found that asymptomatic
HIV-infection is a "handicap" within the meaning of § 504. See, e.g., Doe v. Centinella Hosp., Civ.
87-2514 (D.C. Cal. June 30, 1988) (order granting partial summary judgment holding HIV-infected
individual to be "individual with handicaps" because he was perceived as such by defendant). See also
Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Thomas v. Atascadero
Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Local 1812 v. Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp.
50 (D.D.C. 1987). Accord District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325,
336 (Sup. Ct. 1986). However, the Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts have not yet defini-
tively ruled on this issue.
18. In Arline, the Supreme Court wrote that "[a] person who poses a significant risk of communi-
cating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job
if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk." Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1131 n.16.
Similarly, in passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act this year, Congress added an amendment to
the Rehabilitation Act to clarify the term "otherwise qualified individual with handicaps" in the
employment context. The amendment states that:
[Flor the purpose of [29 U.S.C.] sections 503 and 504, as such sections relate to employment,
such term does not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection
and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of such disease or infection, is unable to
perform the duties of the job.
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 56 U.S.L.W. 46 (Apr. 5, 1988); 134 CONG. REc. H587-8 (daily ed. Mar. 2,
1988).
The recent Justice Department Memorandum expounds on the "factual," and therefore generally
uncertain, nature of this inquiry:
Based on current medical knowledge, it would seem that in most situations the probability
that the AIDS virus will be transmitted is slight, and therefore as a matter of health and safety
there will often be little, if any, justification for treating infected individuals differently from
others. . . As the disease progresses. . . and conditions such as ARC or "full blown" AIDS
affect the physical or mental capacity of the individual, it may well be that an "individualized
inquiry" will reveal that such person is not otherwise qualified to participate.
In addition, current medical knowledge does suggest the possibility of specialized contexts
where, even with respect to a person in the early stages of the disease, a court might find an
individual to be not otherwise qualified. . . . The inquiry in each case will be a factual
one ...
See 1988 Justice Department Memorandum, supra note 14 (emphasis supplied).
19. In Arline, the Supreme Court wrote that "[aiccomodation is not reasonable if it either imposes
'undue financial and administrative burdens' on a grantee, or requires 'a fundamental alteration in
the nature of [the] program.'" 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.17 (citations omitted). One of the more troubling
issues concerning HIV-infected workers is whether in a small, self-insured business the presence of an
HIV-infected employee would pose such an "undue financial burden" on the employee health plan
that the company could justify denying employment to that individual.
20. The indeterminacy of federal discrimination law is mirrored on the state level. Because § 504
applies only to recipients of federal funds, litigants must often turn to state discrimination laws for
protection against discrimination in private employment, public accommodations, and housing. (Hous-
ing discrimination against handicapped persons is now also actionable under the federal Fair Housing
Act. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.) But before state laws can offer such protections, they
each must be interpreted to decide whether AIDS, ARC, and/or asymptomatic HIV infection are
covered disabilities; whether, for instance, nursing homes and doctors' offices are public accommoda-
tions; who is "otherwise qualified"; and what "reasonable accommodation" means, etc.
AIDS and the Law
ing HIV tests as a condition of employment. Arthur Leonard, in his com-
prehensive chapter on AIDS in the workplace, writes:
Generally, handicap discrimination statutes are interpreted to forbid
discriminatory use of tests, which means that employees who are
members of a protected group may not be singled out for special
testing not uniformly given to all employees or applicants ...
However, there seems to be no general prohibition of nondiscrimi-
natory medical testing in the private sector. Apart from those few
jurisdictions which have specifically banned the use of antibody test-
ing, and the restrictions noted under the Rehabilitation Act and com-
parable state and local regulations on the use of test results, it seems
that employers are free to test without violating state and local hand-
icap discrimination laws, although some local enforcement agencies
have taken a different view of the matter. 1
In a parallel discussion of the same subject in "Screening Workers for
AIDS,"22 Mark Rothstein writes that:
The legality of various approaches to testing is no more settled than
is their medical necessity. . . .Many state handicap-discrimination
laws are worded quite generally and have not yet been interpreted
judicially or administratively. Thus, it is not clear whether testing
itself is generally illegal, though it is widely believed that the use of
antibody test results in employment decision making is illegal absent
a showing of job-relatedness.2
Thus, Leonard concludes that "it seems that employers are free to test," '24
while Rothstein concludes that "it is widely believed that the use of an-
tibody test results . . . is illegal."25
Even more interesting than the differing emphases of the authors' con-
clusions, is the carefully crafted language they use to frame these conclu-
sions. Neither author is being evasive. The point is that the law governing
this critical AIDS-related issue is simply not predictable. 28 While, as Dal-
21. Leonard, Aids in the Workplace, in AIDS AND THE LAW 109, 117 (H. Dalton, S. Burnis &
Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
22. Rothstein, Screening Workers for AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 126, 135-37 (H. Dalton, S.
Burnis & Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
23. Id. at 135.
24. Leonard, supra note 21, at 117.
25. Rothstein, supra note 22, at 137.
26. To date, the most important case in this area involved testing of employees in the public
workplace. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb.
1988), affd, No. 88-1678 (8th Cir., Feb. 6, 1989). In Glover, the federal district court enjoined the
implementation of a state program requiring mandatory HIV antibody and hepatitis (HBV) antibody
testing of employees at a residential facility for mentally retarded persons. While the case included
both a § 504 and a Fourth Amendment claim, the court's decision was based on the Fourth Amend-
ment. 686 F. Supp. at 250. The court found that the state could not articulate a compelling reason for
the testing program sufficient to justify this infringement on the employees' constitutional rights. See
also, Anonymous Fireman v. The City of Willoughby, No. 88-1182 (U.S.N.D. Ohio filed May 11,
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ton reminds us, "the principles and procedures that will guide decision-
making are . . . already in place,"27 the existence of stich principles and
procedures makes "AIDS law" no more (or less) certain than the "AIDS
crisis" itself.
B. The Unpredictability of The Application of Judicial Precedent
Similar to the issues raised when applying an existing statute to a new
field of law are those raised when applying judicial precedents to AIDS
for the first time. For example, in AIDS and the Law's chapter entitled
"Doctors and Patients,"28 authors Belitsky and Solomon examine a physi-
cian's duty to warn her patient's sexual partners of the patient's HIV
infection. The authors consider the doctor's ethical and legal responsibility
to safeguard the patient's right to confidentiality. They then proceed to
analyze the Court's decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,29
and its subsequent applicability to cases involving contagious diseases. Af-
ter this discussion, the authors conclude, "[u]nder either a contagious dis-
ease or a Tarasoff analysis, it is likely courts will find that physicians and
therapists have a duty to inform their patients' known sexual partners if
the patient has AIDS."30 While the authors' discussion is a helpful and
concise summary of this area of the law, their conclusion is notably
gauged in ambiguity ("it is likely").
This ambiguity reflects the sense of indeterminacy which governed a
Tarasoff-like case that arose in Kansas in May of 1988. The ACLU was
contacted by an individual who had been told by his health care providers,
an HMO, that it was about to notify his estranged wife of his HIV test
results. The man had been separated from his wife for nearly two years
(since October of 1986) and had not had sex with her during that time.
He tested positive for the HIV antibody in March of 1987. The HMO
subsequently tested his wife on two occasions, in the spring and fall of
1987, and knew she was uninfected. Nonetheless, in May of 1988, four-
teen months after it initially discovered the man's positive test result, the
HMO announced that it was going to notify the wife.
1988) (order granting plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin implementation of
municipality's HIIV testing program of firemen).
27. Dalton, supra note 1, at xii.
28. Belitsky & Solomon, Doctors and Patients: Responsibilities in a Confidential Relationship,
in AIDS AND THE LAw at 201-09 (H. Dalton, S. Burnis & Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
29. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (Tarasoff II). As explained by
Belitsky and Solomon:
The California Supreme Court [in Taraso]fi imposed a duty on psychotherapists to protect
third persons from the potentially dangerous acts of their patients. . . . Tarasoff is particu-
larly significant in the AIDS context, because the transmission of AIDS can, in some instances,
be viewed as the result of intentional action. Moreover, Tarasoff reaffirmed a physician's duty
to protect third parties from dangers created by a patient's illness.
Belitsky & Solomon, supra note 28, at 203-04.
30. Belitsky & Solomon, supra note 28, at 207.
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At times during this case, the HMO's lawyers expressed their concern
as a fear of Tarasoff liability, rather than as a consideration for the wife's
safety, if they did not warn the wife, they feared the clinic might itself
face liability some day. There was, however, little reason to warn the
wife. There was no threat of imminent harm to her since the couple was
separated and thus the infected husband was not likely to have sexual
relations with her. Additionally, since the HMO had tested the wife and
knew her to be uninfected, it knew that she was not an unknowing carrier
of the virus. Finally, although the HMO claimed the husband's HIV in-
fection should have affected his visitation rights, nothing in the medical
literature suggested that visitation posed any threat to the children."'
There was not, therefore, any logical reason to notify the wife of the es-
tranged husband's HIV-test results. We expected a court would side with
the husband, notwithstanding the principles announced in Tarasoff and
its progeny.
In May of 1988, a Kansas court issued a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the HMO from divulging the confidential information to the
estranged wife, and in October the court permanently enjoined the HMO
from disclosing the plaintiff's test results. 2
While the Kansas case is a meaningful precedent supporting the confi-
dentiality of HIV-related information, its value outside of the peculiar
and narrow facts of the case is difficult to assess. 3 If the HMO had not
known that the wife was uninfected and suspected that she might be an
unknowing carrier of the virus, or, if the husband and wife still engaged
in sexual relations with one another and there had been some threat of
imminent infection to the wife, the case might have been decided very
differently.
Despite the existence of guiding principles and precedent borrowed
from other areas of the law, the outcomes of these types of cases are not,
as with the HIV testing situation, predictable in any certain or determi-
nant fashion. Again, the "existence" of such principles and procedures
31. See, e.g., Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1132 (Oct. 29, 1987) (showing that of 30,000 cases of AIDS in United States as
of February 1987, there were no documented cases of casual transmission of HIV through household
contact such as sharing "beds, toilets, bathing facilities, and kitchens, as well as items likely to be
soiled by patients' saliva or bodily fluids (e.g., eating utensils, plates, drinking glasses, and towels).").
See also Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (husband's visitation rights should
not be affected because he was infected with HIV); "Jane" W. v. "John" W., 137 Misc. 2d 24, 519
N.Y.S.2d 603 (1987) (husband's visitation rights should not be affected because he was infected with
HIV); Wallace v. Wallace, No. VFL 013212, Calif. Sup. Ct., San Bernardino City June, 1988;
Courts Says Father With AIDS Should Have Custody Of Son, in AIDS PoLIcy & LAw 2 (November
2, 1988).
32. Doe v. Prime Health/Kansas City, Inc. No. 88-C-5149, slip op. at 11 (Dist. Ct. Johnson
County, Kan., Oct. 17, 1988).
33. Indeed, in his decision in Prime Health, Judge Chipman wrote that "[t]he court is aware that
this matter presents a very serious and sensitive issue, and reminds the parties that this decision is to
be applied only to the parties in this particular case and rendered only upon the facts presented." Id.
at 5.
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does not necessarily relieve the pervasive sense of uncertainty which char-
acterizes AIDS and the Law, and the AIDS crisis itself.
C. The Existence of Conflicting Applicable Laws or Precedent
Differing interpretations of existing law or precedent, such as those
presented in the section 504 cases and in the Kansas case, are not the only
causes of indeterminacy in AIDS law. The possible applicability of differ-
ent laws and/or precedents creates a third area of uncertainty in the legal
system.
A case litigated by the ACLU in South Carolina is illustrative. In
March of 1988, South Carolina's Department of Health and Environ-
mental Control "quarantined" an HIV-infected woman at the state
mental hospital. The Department declared that, in addition to being in-
fected with HIV, the quarantined woman was mentally incompetent, an
intravenous drug user, and a prostitute, and thus a threat to the public
health. Although depriving "Robin"'" of her liberty, the state had not
given her notice or an opportunity to be heard before it isolated her.
Three South Carolina commitment statutes could have been applied to
Robin's situation. Two were fairly modern laws, dealing with the invol-
untary commitment of mentally incompetent persons 5 and chemically de-
pendent persons.3" Both of these laws contained significant procedural
protections. The third statute, dating from the turn of the century, al-
lowed for the indefinite quarantine of an individual without any proce-
dural protections simply upon a finding by the Department that the per-
son presented a threat to public health.
Not surprisingly, Robin had been committed pursuant to the third stat-
ute. A habeas corpus petition was prepared seeking to have Robin's com-
mitment declared unconstitutional and thereby to force her release.3 8 In
the meantime, though not as a consequence of this case, the South Caro-
lina legislature passed a new quarantine statute after the commencement
of the ACLU's efforts on Robin's behalf, which created yet another ave-
nue under which the state could act against Robin. 9
34. Only the client's first name was used in an effort to safeguard her privacy.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-17-510 to 520 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
36. Id. at §§ 44-51-50 to 70.
37. Id. at §§ 44-1-80, 44-29-90.
38. The ACLU also expected to bring a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaration that
the obsolete quarantine statute was unconstitutional and enjoining its further implementation. We
envisioned that such a ruling from the federal court system would have wide precedential value, espe-
cially in states which still have archaic quarantine statutes.
39. The new statute, though still unconstitutional from the ACLU's perspective, did contain some
indicia of due process. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-115 (Law Co-op, 1988) now requires the Depart-
ment, prior to isolating an individual, to file a petition with the probate court specifying the "harm
thought probable and the factual basis for this belief." The person at issue is entitled to representation
and to an appeal. The standard of proof is set forth as follows: "If the court, after due notice and
hearing, is satisfied that the petition is well founded, it may order that the person be isolated." Id.
The court ordered isolation cannot last more than 90 days.
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Ultimately, Robin's case was decided without the ruling as to the con-
stitutionality of the quarantine statute. Despite the existence of the quar-
antine order, the Department eventually sought to have Robin involunta-
rily committed pursuant to the chemical dependence statute, as well, and
she was granted the state court hearing called for by that statute. At that
hearing, the ACLU was able to show that there was no evidence in the
record supporting commitment on these grounds, and Robin was released,
although she was involuntarily ordered to undergo outpatient drug treat-
ment. The state dissolved the quarantine order. In sum, this case exempli-
fies the indeterminacy that can be created, although the "principles and
procedures for decision-making are, for the most part, already in place,"40
by the possible application of a variety of such principles and procedures.
In AIDS and the Law, Frederic C. Kass's chapter, "Schoolchildren
with AIDS," 41 provides an insightful exploration of this theme. Kass re-
views three cases involving a single issue-whether schoolchildren with
AIDS should be admitted to the classroom-each of which turned on a
different legal issue. In one case from Queens, New York,"2 section 504
was viewed as the governing statute: "The court ruled that automatic ex-
clusion of schoolchildren with AIDS would have violated [section 504]."43
In a second case from Indiana," the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (EHA),"5 was viewed as the governing statute.' 6 In a third case
from New Jersey,'4 the admission of two HIV-infected children turned
largely on whether state administrative regulations had been properly
enacted.' 8
In some circumstances, choices among the statutes and regulations can
lead to contradictory results. For example, the procedural requirements of
the EHA and section 504 differ greatly: the EHA requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies (which can be quite long and time consuming)
before a case can be brought in federal court, while the Rehabilitation Act
has been interpreted as not requiring exhaustion.4' Because of these ex-
haustion requirements, school boards tend to promote the applicability of
40. Dalton, supra note 1, at xiii.
41. Kass, Schoolchildren with AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 66 (H. Dalton, S. Burnis & Yale
AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
42. Id. at 73 (citing In re District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d
325 (Sup. Ct. 1986)).
43. Kass, supra note 41, at 75.
44. Id. at 76 (citing White v. Western School Corp., No. IP-85-1192-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16,
1985)).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
46. Kass, supra note 41, at 76-77.
47. Id. at 77-78 (citing Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 209 N.J. Super. 174, 507 A.2d 253 (App.
Div. 1986)).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (ex-
haustion of administrative remedies is not prerequisite to filing claim for relief under § 504 of Reha-
bilitation Act).
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the EHA and use it as a defense in section 504 cases, asking federal courts
to dismiss section 504 cases for failure to exhaust EHA administrative
procedures.50
A second example of overlapping and possibly contradictory extant le-
gal standards occurs with regard to the issue of antibody testing by the
government. Such testing may be challenged as a constitutional violation
arising under the Fourth Amendment and as a legal question arising
under the Rehabilitation Act. 51 In Glover,5" the district court halted a
testing program on constitutional grounds, without comment on the plain-
tiffs' section 504 claims. On appeal,53 the state argued that the court must
have decided the Rehabilitation Act issue against the plaintiffs, otherwise
it would never have reached the constitutional question. Thus, at present,
one could read the applicable statute and the applicable constitutional
standard as creating conflicting results.
In sum, existing statutes and precedent are, as AIDS and the Law quite
proficiently shows, the obvious materials upon which to draw in AIDS-
related legal situations. And, as editor Dalton insists, these extant legal
materials provide a structure and framework for the manner in which
AIDS-related law will develop. However, AIDS and the Law also illus-
trates the indeterminacy that is inherent in the applications of these ex-
isting materials-the uncertainty of initial applications of existing, and
sometimes conflicting, laws and precedents to AIDS-related situations.
While there is truth in Dalton's statement that "the practical differences
[between AIDS and old problems] . . . can be apprehended and taken
account of by the law with relative ease,'"" there is truth in the converse,
as well. The law does not provide an organized oasis outside the social
reality of the AIDS crisis, but rather helps form, and is itself formed by,
the governing uncertainty of that social reality.
II. THE DESTABILIZING CONSEQUENCES OF NEW LAWS
As if there was not enough indeterminacy in attempting to apply ex-
isting legal doctrines to AIDS, state legislatures and Congress are con-
stantly changing the available legal materials.
In 1987, more than 450 bills concerning AIDS were introduced in state
50. See, e.g., Doe v. Belleville Pub. School Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Il1. 1987)
(EAH did not apply to student with AIDS and thus he was not required to exhaust EAH administra-
tive remedies and could bring § 504 claim in federal court).
51. See Local 1812 v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987). The two discussions
of employment-related antibody testing in AIDS and te Law (see supra text accompanying notes
21-26) are examinations of testing in the private sector. They focus on the Rehabilitation Act because
such private employer testing does not raise constitutional issues.
52. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988); See supra note 26.
53. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988) af'd, No. 88-1678 (8th Cir. Feb. 6, 1989).
54. Dalton, supra note 1, at xiii.
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legislatures across the country.55 Despite the often haphazard quality of
many of these state legislative responses," they have largely shaped the
rules governing relationships between persons with AIDS and society.
How these rules will be enforced and how they will affect the social rela-
tionships they are intended to govern is undetermined.57 Yet, the contribu-
tion of state legislatures to the development of AIDS-related law is diffi-
cult to overstate.
One of the overwhelming difficulties of compiling a book about a new
and changing area of law, and AIDS-related law in particular, is how to
take account of these legislative developments. The focus of AIDS and the
Law is litigative, not legislative. The book does not include a chapter or
section which attempts to summarize these legislative initiatives. This
omission implies that the legal materials to be drawn on already exist. 8
However, the book also contains a competing vision of a state of affairs
that may soon change with the passage of new legislation.
For instance, new regulations significantly altered one section of AIDS
55. Lewis, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: State Legislative Activity, 258 J. AM. MED. A.
2410 (Nov. 6, 1987). Lewis groups these proposed laws into ten subject areas: (1) antibody testing, (2)
blood and blood products, (3) confidentiality, (4) employment, (5) housing, (6) informed consent, (7)
insurance, (8) marriage, (9) prison population, and (10) reporting. Id.
56. In some states, legislators have attempted to deal with a number of AIDS-related issues in
one, seemingly comprehensive, bill. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 2067, 64th Or. Leg. Assembly Reg. Sess.
(1987) (amending sections of Oregon public health laws dealing with name reporting, contact tracing,
isolation, quarantine, and other preventive public health measures; requiring informed consent for
HIV testing; mandating confidentiality of HIV test results; providing immunity from civil liability to
health care providers who comply with confidentiality provisions; directing establishment of preva-
lence studies and education curricula; ordering development of plan for dealing with AIDS in prisons;
and requiring HIV testing for persons convicted of sex and drug-related crimes).
Other states have enacted a hodgepodge of disparate statutes. In Illinois, for example, at least 11
AIDS-related bills were passed at the conclusion of the 1987 Congressional term and sent to the
governor for his signature. H.R. Res. 100, 1987 Ill. Leg., Regular Sess. (requiring informed consent
for HIV tests and confidentiality of results); S. Res. 100, 1987 Ill. Leg., Regular Sess. (requiring
informed consent for HIV tests and confidentiality of results); S. Ras. 100, 1987 Ill. Leg., Regular
Sess. (incentive payments for care of AIDS patients in nursing homes); S. Res. 994, 1987 Il1. Leg.
Regular Sess. (demonstration projects for long-term care; establishment of state AIDS Foundation);
H. Res. 736, 1987 Ill. Leg. Regular Sess. (AIDS Registry, public employee education, expansion of
Medicaid-eligible services); ILL S. REs. 550, 1987 Ill. Leg. Regular Sess. (AIDS education to accom-
pany sex education); S. Res. 1225, 1987 Regular Sess. (abstinence from sex until marriage education
to accompany sex education); S. Res. 85, Regular Sess. (1987) (testing of marriage license applicants,
inmates, and hospital admittees); H. Res. 2044, 1987 Il1. Leg. Regular Sess. (testing of marriage
license applicants, convicted sex and drug offenders, and requiring notification of principals when
pupils have HIV antibodies); Ill. S. Res. 651, 1987 Il1. Leg. Regular Sess. (authorizing Department
of Public Health to require reporting of HIV-infected individuals and to trace sexual contacts of such
persons, and codifying quarantine procedures); H. Res. 2682, 1987 Il. Leg. Regular Sess. (mandating
contact tracing for HIV-infected persons and requiring name reporting of seropositive persons to
health department). The governor then fashioned his own comprehensive AIDS bill by choosing
among those put before him as he saw fit. "Broad AIDS Law Signed In Illinois," N.Y. Times, Sept.
21, 1987, at B7.
Some states have simply enacted one or two single issue AIDS-related measures. Louisiana, for
example, passed two laws in 1987 concerning AIDS, one criminalizing intentional exposure to the
AIDS virus, H. REs. 1728, 1987 La. Leg. Regular Sess. and a second requiring clinical testing for
AIDS prior to issuance of a marriage license, 1987 H.R. 336, LA. Leg. Regular Sess. (1987).
57. See supra Part I.
58. Dalton, supra note 1, at xii.
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and the Law between the time the book was completed and the time it
was published. A "NOTE" at the beginning of AIDS and the Law's ex-
cellent section on intravenous drug abusers reads simply: "As this book
went to press, the federal confidentiality regulations discussed at pp.
266-76 were being renumbered and significantly revised, effective Aug.
10, 1987. The new regulations, which place fewer restrictions on the re-
lease of information, appear at 52 Fed. Reg. 21,796 (1987)." 5l The
NOTE describing the changes in the confidentiality regulations is admira-
ble and brings the reader as up to date as possible.
Similarly, the recent passage of congressional amendments to the Fair
Housing Act,60 has substantially affected the subject matter of Daniel
Mandelker's chapter on AIDS and Housing. These amendments extend
the Fair Housing Act's protections to handicapped persons and specifi-
cally to people with AIDS, ARC, and HIV infection."1
While these subsequent legislative developments affect the value of the
legal discussions in these chapters, other chapters, specifically, John F.
Decker's chapter on Prostitution as a Public Health Issue62 and Jane
Aiken's chapter on Education as Prevention,63 appear to be geared toward
ongoing legislative debates. Decker summarizes state legislative proposals
concerning AIDS and prostitution and considers the medically unwar-
ranted reactions of most of these measures. His chapter was one of the
first published arguments 4 rationally examining the relationship between
prostitution and the spread of AIDS.6 5
59. O'Neill, Intravenous Drug Abusers, in AIDS AND THE LAW 253 (H. Dalton & S. Burnis,
Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
60. Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, H.R. 1158, as amended, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134
CONG. REC. 46491 (Aug. 8, 1988).
61. Id. Mandelker did not appear to recognize the effect the Fair Housing Act amendments
would have on AIDS-related housing issues. His acknowledgement of the pending legislation that
would extend the Act's protections to handicapped persons appears only in an endnote, which the
reader must (and probably will not) turn to the back of the book to read. Mandelker, Housing Issues,
in AIDS AND THE LAW 326 n.18 (H. Dalton & S. Burris, Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
62. Decker, Prostitution as a Public Health Issue, in AIDS AND THE LAW 81 (H. Dalton & S.
Burris, Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
63. Aiken, Education as Prevention, in AIDS AND THE LAW 90 (H. Dalton & S. Burris, Yale
AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
64. Recent studies have added support to Decker's conclusion. See, e.g., Prostitution: Widespread
Use of Condoms Said to Provide Small Risk, in AIDS PoLcy & LAW (Oct. 5, 1988); Rosenberg &
Weiner, Prostitutes and AIDS: A Health Department Priority?, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 418 (1988);
Quinn, et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Among Patients Attending Clinics for Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 197, 199 (1988); U.S. Centers for Disease Con-
trol, Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Female Prostitutes, 257 J. AM. MED. A. 2011
(Apr. 17, 1987); AIDS Among Prostitutes Not as Prevalent as Believed, Studies Show, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 20, 1988, at B1, col. 2 (city ed.).
65. In contrast to this rational examination of this issue, many legislators and commentators auto-
matically assume the existence of some relationship between AIDS and prostitution. For example, the
President's AIDS Commission, in its final report, stated in a section entitled "Criminalization of HIV
Transmission," that an "Obstacle to Progress" in this area is that "[p]enalties for prostitution are too
lenient and enforcement of prostitution laws is erratic." THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC REPORT 130 (June 1988). Accordingly, the Commis-
sion recommended that "Prostitution laws should be strictly enforced." Id. at 131.
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Similarly, in her chapter on Education as Prevention, 6 Jane Aiken ap-
pears to have foreseen Congress' enactment of the "Helms Amendment"6 7
and has lucidly addressed its impact and legality. The Helms Amendment
provides that no funds from the Centers for Disease Control "shall be
used to provide AIDS education, information, or prevention materials and
activities that promote or encourage, directly, homosexual activities." 8
Aiken's chapter is one of the first considerations of the legal issues, such
as the First Amendment ramifications, raised by the Helms Amendment,
although it was written before the Amendment was proposed." Larry
Gostin's chapter on Traditional Public Health Strategies70 also attempts
to deal with ongoing legislative issues and the legality of many of these
solutions.
Just as the publication of AIDS and the Law was affected, and in some
cases superceded, by breaking legislative developments, so to litigative ef-
forts to define AIDS law are also prone to these external influences. For
example, in the South Carolina case described above, the ACLU busily
prepared a case challenging the constitutionality of a statute which was
about to be displaced by a new statute. Similarly, coincidental to the
events in the Kansas case discussed above, Kansas passed a new law con-
cerning the confidentiality of HIV test results. 1 This subsequent, external
development impacted the outcome of the case, 2 though it was beyond the
control of those involved in the case and was not a consequence of the
case.
These external, often legislative, developments largely constitute what is
becoming AIDS law, and clearly demonstrate that this body of the law is
constantly changing. AIDS and the Law, in its attempt to bring order to
This "obstacle" and the "recommendation" are accompanied by absolutely no textual material dis-
cussing prostitution, much less any discussion attempting to show a connection between prostitution
and AIDS. Therefore, there appears to be no basis for the Commission's recommendation that prosti-
tution laws should be more strictly enforced. Nor is there any support for the assumption inherent in
such a recommendation-namely, that enforcement of prostitution laws would impede the spread of
HIV.
66. Aiken, supra note 63.
67. Labor-Health and Human Services Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-102, § 514.
68. Id. at § 514(a). The Helms Amendment also requires all AIDS education activities and
materials to "emphasize abstinence from sexual activity outside a sexually monogamous marriage
(including abstinence from homosexual sexual activities)." Id. at § 514(b).
If a recipient of CDC funds contravenes this law in any respect, the Act penalizes the infraction by
providing that "no further funds shall be provided to a recipient." Id.
69. Aiken's analysis anticipated the analysis the ACLU undertook prior to filing a case challeng-
ing the legality of the Helms Amendment. Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Bowen, No. 88-7482
(S.D.N.Y., complaint filed Oct. 20, 1988).
70. Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies. in AIDS AND THE LAW 47 (H. Dalton, S.
Burris & Yale AIDS Law Project eds. 1987).
71. See S. Res. 686, 1988 Kans. Sess. 1359; H. Res. 2759, 1988 Kans. Sess. 1368.
72. Although these bills did not control the outcome of the case, Judge Chipman concluded that
they "reinforce and demonstrate that it is the public policy of the state to impose a duty of confidenti-
ality not only on doctors who possess information concerning the identity of HIV patients, but on
others who acquire that information as well." Prime Health, No. 88-C-5149, slip opinion, 11, 12.
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AIDS law, in some places submerges these destabilizing influences; in
other places, the book's attempt to control the AIDS crisis involves recog-
nition and anticipation of these future developments. This inclusion of the
tension between order and uncertainty in AIDS-related law is one of the
strengths of the book. It is a strength because it reflects the general desire
of the legal system to order uncertainty, and it is a strength because it
parallels another, non-legal, effort to order the specific uncertainty of the
AIDS crisis-the efforts of people with AIDS to come to grips with AIDS
itself.
III. THE PWA EMPOWERMENT MOVEMENT
AIDS and the Law does not fully capture the efforts of people with
AIDS (PWAs) to deal with the anxiety of the AIDS crisis. This absence
is understandable. The voices of people with AIDS were not loudly heard
nor was their plight widely understood at the time AIDS and the Law
was published, and a book such as AIDS and the Law is, like its legal
conclusions, bound to a specific historical moment. "Such are the trials,"
editor Dalton writes, "of trying to produce a book about an epidemic
when its collateral consequences continue to multiply.1
73
In his preface to AIDS and the Law, Dalton describes a meeting
shortly before the book's publication at which a newly recruited student
asked: "Do you have a chapter on the licensing of new drugs?"74 With
"mild embarrassment," Dalton answered the student: "[In soliciting the
manuscripts fifteen months earlier, we had not anticipated how important
the issue would become. '7 5 In fact, this subject, which was coming to the
fore just as AIDS and the Law was being published, is tied to the develop-
ment of the PWA empowerment movement. The movement represents the
formal expression of people with AIDS' attempts at ordering their ordeal,
and this movement interestingly parallels, and sometimes intersects with,
AIDS and the Law's attempts to order the legal aspects of the AIDS
crisis.
The People with AIDS empowerment movement dates to the Second
National AIDS Forum held at the National Lesbian and Gay Health
Conference in Denver in June of 1983. PWAs at the conference ratified
the "Founding Statement of People with AIDS/ARC" (the "Denver
Principles"), 76 which included recommendations for health care profes-
sionals, people with AIDS, and the public. The recommendations are per-
haps best summarized by the statement which accompanies them: "We
73. Dalton, supra note 1, at xv.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Founding Statement of People with AIDSIARC: "The Denver Principles," in SURVIVING
AND THRIVING WITH AIDS: HINTS FOR THE NEWLY DIAGNOSED 128-29 (M. Callen ed. 1987)
[hereinafter The Denver Principles].
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condemn attempts to label us as 'victims', which implies defeat, and we
are only occasionally 'patients' which implies passivity, helplessness and
dependence upon the care of others. We are 'people with AIDS.' ""7
The purpose of the PWA empowerment movement and of the Denver
Principles is also summarized by the Mission Statement of the National
Association of People with AIDS (NAPWA):
We are people with AIDS and people with AIDS-Related Complex
(ARC) who can speak for ourselves to advocate for our own causes
and concerns. We are your sons and daughters, your brothers and
sisters, your family, friends and lovers. As people now living with
AIDS and ARC, we have a unique and essential contribution to
make to the dialogue surrounding AIDS and we will actively partici-
pate with full and equal credibility to help shape the perception and
reality surrounding this disease.
We do not see ourselves as victims. We will not be victimized. We
have the right to be treated with respect, dignity, compassion and
understanding. We have the right to lead fulfilling, productive
lives-to live and die with dignity and compassion. 8
The PWA empowerment movement has effected the following types of
changes, each with its own legal consequences. First, on an individual
level, many PWAs have upset the traditional roles assigned by our society
to "doctors" and "patients" and, in so doing, have challenged the existing
legal relationships between doctors and patients. The Denver Principles,
for instance, call on health care professionals to "[glet in touch with their
feelings (e.g., fears, anxieties, hopes, etc.) about AIDS, and not simply
deal with AIDS intellectually. 7' Furthermore, the Principles recognize
the rights of PWAs to "full explanations of all medical procedures and
risks, to choose or refuse their treatment modalities, to refuse to partici-
pate in research without jeopardizing their treatment and to make in-
formed decisions about their lives."8 These principles have been effectu-
ated in a number of ways. For instance, PWAs regularly publish
newsletters which share information about doctors and about treatments. 1
Similarly, PWAs have formed "Buyers Clubs" which have arranged for
77. Id.
78. Statement of Purpose of The National Association of People with AIDS, in SURVIVING AND
THRIVING wrrH AIDS: HINTS FOR THE NEWLY DIAGNOSED 130 (M. Callen, ed. 1987).
79. The Denver Principles, supra note 76, at 128.
80. Id.
81. The People With AIDS Coalition in New York publishes a magazine, the NEWSLINE, which
is a collection of PWA-written articles and letters directed to other PWAs concerning a wide range of
issues including different types of experimental drugs, the side effects they have been experiencing,
how to get drugs and where to get them cheapest, which doctors can be trusted, etc. According to the
October, 1988 NEWSLINE, PWA newsletters also exist in San Francisco, Dallas, Minneapolis, Phila-
delphia, and Washington, D.C.. PWA NEwss Tr.Rs, 37 NEWSLINE 28 (Oct. 1988).
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the purchase and distribution of experimental treatments to PWAs and
PWARCs.
The legal consequences of this type of empowerment are typified by the
following example. In the spring of 1988, the ACLU was contacted by an
individual (Steve) 2 who had been a participant in an experimental drug
trial which had ended in February. Steve believed he had been induced
into entering the trial two years ago with, inter alia, the promise that he
could continue receiving the treatment indefinitely and without cost at the
conclusion of the trial if he so desired. He had been faithful to the experi-
mental drug for two years, even ignoring his doctors' advice to go on AZT
during a period of particular illness, and he now wanted to continue re-
ceiving it although the trial's results had been disappointingly
inconclusive.
The company, however, said that it could no longer provide Steve with
the treatment, because, among other things, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) would not allow it to make assertions about the drug's
efficacy. The company feared that providing the drug to Steve would be
tantamount to claiming that it worked. Moreover, the doctors, who were
involved with the drug trial and who continued to be Steve's treating phy-
sicians, did not share his recollection of the promises that were made at
the beginning of the trial. They also did not believe the drug was effective
and were not enthusiastic about Steve continuing treatment.
Despite his doctors' doubts about the drug and their doubts about his
memory of the promises that were made, Steve wanted to continue on the
treatment and was convinced that he had been promised that he could.
He found the strength to empower himself, to challenge his doctors, whom
he generally trusted and relied on to provide him care, and to challenge a
large drug company. He won. The case was settled with a series of phone
calls to the company's headquarters, and Steve has been supplied with the
experimental treatment free of charge ever since. Although Steve's case
never resulted in formal litigation, it nonetheless raised legal issues involv-
ing contract law and FDA law which were not anticipated when AIDS
and the Law was published.
A second aspect of this movement is the collectivization of PWAs and
persons concerned about AIDS, particularly gay men and lesbians. This
collectivization has created unique care communities which have radically
reconceptualized the ways in which we think about "family" and "car-
ing." For instance, every large city in the country now has an AIDS ser-
vice organization. These organizations typically provide a wide range of
services for PWAs in their area, many of which are not provided by the
government or by traditional health care providers. Such services include
82. "Steve" is not the client's real name but is used to protect his privacy.
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the provision of "buddies" to people with AIDS, and the provision, in a
sense, of families to people who have often been abandoned by their own.
AIDS service organizations also provide financial services to people
with AIDS free of charge. Such services generally include information
about, and help receiving, benefits such as (in New York City) social se-
curity disability, supplemental security income, unemployment compensa-
tion, Medicaid, New York City income maintenance welfare, New York
State disability, insurance, and housing. In addition, legal centers at AIDS
organizations offer services such as the preparation of wills and powers of
attorney and referrals for larger legal problems like discrimination cases.
AIDS and the Law does not address these issues; it is very consciously
not a legal handbook for people with AIDS. For example, although one
chapter is authored by Mark Senak,"8 who was the legal director of the
Gay Men's Health Crisis in New York for a number of years, it does not
deal with the kinds of legal work done for PWAs by GMHC, but is a
general history of the gay rights movement. Similarly, Mark Scherzer's
Insurance 4 chapter is an overview of the insurance industry, not a primer
on how to help people with AIDS find insurance and gain access to bene-
fits.8 5 Obviously, a choice was made to focus on these larger issues rather
than to provide direct advice for PWAs and their lawyers. This choice
was doubtlessly affected by, among other factors, the time period in which
the choice was made, namely, before PWA empowerment brought issues
directly involving PWAs to the center of concern.
Beyond individual empowerment and collectivization, a third aspect of
PWA empowerment has been that PWA groups and AIDS service orga-
nizations have become forceful lobbies on issues of importance to them.
The legal consequence of such lobbying is, quite simply, that the AIDS-
related laws emanating from state legislatures and Congress have come to
reflect the concerns of PWAs and AIDS advocates.
In addition to traditional lobbying and advocacy, PWAs have taken
their anger about government inaction and societal indifference to the
streets-picketing, demonstrating, and engaging in civil disobedience
around issues of importance to them. In March of 1987, an AIDS activist
group was formed in New York City and began meeting weekly at the
Lesbian and Gay Community Service Center calling itself ACT-UP, or
the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power. A year and a half later, the
weekly ACT-UP meetings are attended by several hundred people. Simi-
83. Senak, The Lesbian & Gay Community in AIDS AND THE LAW 290 (H. Dalton, S. Burris &
Yale AIDS Law Project eds., 1987).
84. Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAW 185 (H. Dalton, S. Burris & Yale AIDS Law
Project eds., 1987).
85. Scherzer has written excellent pieces about these more specific issues in other places. Scherzer,
Insurance, in LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND INC.: AIDS LEGAL GUIDE 5-1 to
5-8 (A. Rubenfeld 2d ed. 1987); Scherzer, Insurance and AIDS, in NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD:
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 16-1 to 16-30 (R. Achtenberg ed. 1987).
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
lar groups have sprung up around the country, loosely collected under a
national umbrella organization, ACT-NOW (AIDS Coalition to Net-
work, Organize and Win).
ACT-UP has taken lawyers who work with AIDS and with people
with AIDS into areas of law not contemplated when AIDS and the Law
was published. For instance, in March of 1988, to celebrate their first
anniversary, 110 members of ACT-UP were arrested for sitting, nonvi-
olently, in the middle of the street during the morning Wall Street rush
hour. They were protesting the government's lack of interest in developing
AIDS therapies and did so on Wall Street to denounce what they viewed
as Wall Street's acquiescence to this indifference. Their posters read,
"The Federal Interest Rate on AIDS-0%."
The 110 ACT-UP members were charged with disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest. They pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss the charges
"in the interest of justice," basing the motion on an argument that their
actions were a justified response to this country's AIDS policy. What fol-
lows is the Affidavit of ACT-UP member Michael Cowing, which sup-
ported the protesters' motion to dismiss."6 The affidavit is a product of the
legal system's effort to control the AIDS crisis. It also represents the ex-
pression of a person in the AIDS community struggling to take control of
the AIDS crisis. It is, as such, an intersection of the movements described
in this essay. I have reprinted the affidavit in full because I believe such a
document is crucial to understanding AIDS law, yet such a voice cannot
be found in AIDS and the Law.
IV. AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL COWING: "WHY I PARTICIPATED IN
THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ACTION ON MARCH 25, 1988"
Richard died in July, 1984. He had just turned 30. He was an histo-
rian and had one of the finest minds I have ever known. He was
diagnosed with AIDS-related pneumonia and fourteen days later he
was gone. His last two weeks were agonizing for him. That was
1984. So little was known about the disease-so few drugs were
available. Had more treatments been available, he might have been
saved. He can never be replaced.
Victor became ill in the Spring of 1986. He had a persistent cough
and sporadic fevers. Eventually he became too sick to work and had
to stay home confined to bed. His money ran out and he lost his
apartment so he had to go home to Ohio to stay with his fam-
ily-they didn't even want him. They were ignorant about AIDS
and they were afraid. It was 1986 and very little information was
available about the disease. Although responsible physicians and
86. Affidavit of Michael Cowing filed with the Criminal Court in the Borough of Manhattan,
New York County (on file with ACLU) [hereinafter Affidavit].
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scientists had gone on record as stating that the AIDS virus was not
casually transmitted, the information was not made available to the
general public on a widespread basis. Victor developed Toxoplasmo-
sis, an infection in the brain, which later progresses into AIDS de-
mentia. His mind completely disintegrated and he died in September
of that same year, but by then he was no longer the friend I had
known. The Victor I had come to know and love was a gentle, bril-
liant man. He was a linguist and had a curiosity about life and peo-
ple that was immediately disarming. He was 36 years old. His death
was a terrible waste. He might have held on till better therapies
became available but then it was 1986 and so little was known-so
few effective treatments were available.
Kenneth was a funny kind of guy. He had been confused the last
couple of years, seemed to have no direction, didn't know what he
wanted out of life. Then in the summer of 1986, he decided to go to
law school. Suddenly, he was filled with purpose and drive. He ap-
plied for and was accepted by Cardoza Law School and enrolled that
fall. He immediately took to the curriculum and established a 4.0
grade point average that he maintained until he left school. In Janu-
ary of 1987, he came down with a terrible flu that he just couldn't
shake. He got weaker and weaker and lost a frightening amount of
weight. He was diagnosed with AIDS in mid-February. By the first
week of March, he was gone. He had AIDS-related pneumonia and
didn't respond to the treatments that were available. It happened so
fast we didn't even realize that we'd lost him until after the funeral
was over. Ken was one of the most loving people I've ever been priv-
ileged to know. He was keenly interested in the spiritual side of our
experience and was always trying to make us see the deeper meaning
of things, the value in ourselves. Not a day goes by that I don't think
of him. It's still hard to accept that he's not a part of my life any-
more. I believe that he would have gotten through the pneumonia,
would have finished law school, if more had been known about how
to treat AIDS-if more effective drugs had been available.
Eddis was diagnosed with lymphoma in January of 1987. He
started radiation and chemotherapy treatments right away and his
doctors said he had a better than even chance of beating it. He cer-
tainly had the right attitude, that's for sure. He just made up his
mind that he was strong enough to deal with whatever came along.
He responded well to the treatment at first. Then in May he devel-
oped Kaposi's Sarcoma, an AIDS-related cancer. Even then his gen-
eral health was good and his spirits stayed high. His friends were
shattered by the news but he kept our hopes alive and made us laugh
at our own fears. Suddenly in September, he came down with pneu-
monia and was rushed to NYU Medical Center. He was placed on a
respirator and was delirious for four weeks. Of course he couldn't
talk to us and the pain killers made him so groggy that most days he
couldn't even write legibly to communicate his needs. He suffered
terribly then and I didn't know whether to pray for his recovery or
for a release from the agony he was in. The thing none of us counted
on was his incredible fighting ability. He scribbled on his pad one
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
day that it wasn't time for him to go yet and that we should just dig
in for the duration. And he was right. After nearly ten weeks on the
respirator, he was strong enough to breathe on his own again. His
doctors said that they had never seen a person come through as he
had. They confided in us that they never expected him to come off
the respirator and certainly never to leave the hospital alive. His
indominatable spirit proved everyone wrong. He recovered from the
pneumonia and was released from the hospital in early December. I
could see, however, during my visits with him in the ensuing weeks
that his whole body was slowly falling apart. But the power of his
love and acceptance and courage never wavered for a moment. He
died quietly at 4:16 p.m. on Tuesday, February 23rd of this year.
His last words were, 'I'm not afraid. Don't worry.' I know that had
more treatments been available, Eddis would still be here sharing his
lovely light in our lives. It is now 1988 and another friend is gone. I
cannot accept that we have come such a little way in this fight-that
since I lost Richard in July of 1984 there are still so few drugs and
treatments available for AIDS.
I participated in the civil disobedience action on March 24, 1988
on Broadway and Rector Streets because I believe that if we all raise
our voices loud enough and long enough, the federal health agencies
and the government bureaucrats who are directing the AIDS effort
will recognize that they can and must try harder, that the solution
can be found if we spare no effort in finding more and better treat-
ments for this horrible disease. I believe it is my absolute duty to
bring this issue to the attention of the public, the government, the
courts until such a solution is found. I must add for the record that
my warrant charges me with thrashing my arms and legs while be-
ing carried to the bus by the police. That is not true. I was not there
that morning to engage in physical violence of any sort. I went com-
pletely limp when the officers began to drag me away and was tossed
into the bus on my head rather than even being given the option to
stand and walk on board when we reached the vehicle. My neck,
arms and back were badly bruised as a result.
My friends' deaths, and the deaths of the more than 34,000 others
who have succumbed to AIDS, cannot and must not have been in
vain. With the accumulated pain of so many losses, I have accepted
the knowledge and the responsibility that I, as an individual, must
do everything within my power to ensure that others will not have to
endure the kind of anguish and torment that my friends did. It is the
most loving tribute to their memories that I can think of. 7
V. CONCLUSION
As a lawyer, when I "accept[ed] the knowledge and responsibility that I
. . . [had to] do everything within my power to ensure that others [would]
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not have to endure the kind of anguish and torment that my friends
did,""8 I, naturally, looked to the law. I came to do AIDS-related legal
work because I thought that such work would give me an opportunity to
"control" AIDS in some way. It loomed as a constructive alternative to
the constant worrying about myself, checking my body for lesions and my
mouth for thrush, and about my friends, which had characterized my ini-
tial reaction to AIDS. I looked to the law as a place where I could bring
some sort of order to the uncertainty and anxiety that defines my life as a
gay man in the AIDS era.
In much the same way, the editors and authors and the Yale AIDS
Law Project have attempted through AIDS and the Law to come to grips
with the anxiety of the AIDS crisis. In putting together this book, they
have wrestled with the social reality of AIDS and attempted to lay an
organizing, legal framework onto that reality. They have done an excel-
lent job.
Nonetheless, AIDS resists. While we empower ourselves to take control
of it, and while those of us who are lawyers work through the legal sys-
tem to bring order to it, AIDS continues to spread and to kill. The inde-
terminacy, the anxiety, and the confusion of the AIDS crisis is embodied
in AIDS-related legal discourse. When seeking to order that discourse, we
should not submerge AIDS' turbulence, but rather should ensure that it
continues to inform our efforts.
88. Id.
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